London’s police asked Big Tech for comms data over 700,000 times last year

London’s Metropolitan Police – the UK’s largest police force – asked tech companies to give officers access to private communications data over 700,000 times in 2025 alone, according to figures obtained by The Register under the Freedom of Information Act.

These statistics expose the monitoring of everyday platforms like takeaway delivery services, and also show a massive surge in the force’s surveillance of the users of low cost MVNO LycaMobile. Additionally, our FoI exposed the acquisition of data from encrypted messaging services designed to offer privacy.

Since 2024, the Met says that it has obtained communications data (CD) from Proton’s privacy-focused mail service users 139 times. CD is not messaging content, but metadata. In Proton’s case, this could include account payment details and, in some instances, IP addresses.

Although Proton did not dispute these figures, a spokesperson told us: “Proton does not transmit data directly to any foreign law enforcement agencies,” adding that it operates under a “strict legal framework” so all requests must go through the Swiss authorities.

Requests for data that don’t meet Proton’s legal and human rights requirements are refused, which it has an “established practice” of doing, according to the spokesperson.

The Met also claims that it has acquired data results from ProtonVPN, although the non-profit says this is “highly dubious and inconsistent with our technical reality […] because Proton VPN does not log user activity, there is no data to provide,” referring El Reg to its transparency report.

“We engage with every request in good faith, but we simply cannot hand over what we do not collect,” Proton said.

The Met’s data also suggests encrypted messenger Signal has provided data once since 2024. But this is also, apparently, contrary to records that the non-profit holds.

A spokesperson told us: “Signal collects very little data about its users to begin with and publishes the requests we respond to at signal.org/bigbrother. We have not shared any user data in response to a legal request originating from the United Kingdom.”

If data was shared by Signal it could only include phone numbers, when the account was created, and when the user last accessed the platform.

When queried about the denials by both Proton and Signal, the police force said it couldn’t comment on the specifics of how it acquired the data.

The Met Police says that all companies “have a legal obligation” to cooperate with officials thanks to the powers of the Office for Communications Data Authorizations (OCDA). The OCDA is now a part of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office (IPCO), which monitors the select public authorities, law enforcement agencies, and government departments with the power to acquire comms data.

But there’s some fog around authorizations for the police, according to Dr Bernard Keenan, a law lecturer and surveillance researcher at University College London: “When it comes to communications data and metadata, it’s seen as a less severe intrusion than intercepting or accessing the content of a message, and so while the police need an authorization to get it, the decision is delegated to designated senior officers. So it’s something that the police can do operationally, more-or-less autonomously.”

Sources compromised

In 2024, the year of the most recent IPCO annual report, it was found that these authorizations to all law enforcement agencies affected lawyers 219 times and journalists on 157 occasions. This came with a caveat: “Most [CD] applications relating to sensitive professionals were submitted because the individual had been a victim of a crime.”

While CD does not contain message content itself, there remains a risk that contacts such as a journalist’s sources could be disclosed.

Also in the report is the revelation that in 2024, 106 warrant applications were issued to specifically identify journalists’ sources, and under these separate powers, the request could also include the communications content itself.

There’s no requirement to inform sensitive professionals they have been targeted in this way, and while ordinary law enforcement agencies need to seek a judge’s approval, intelligence and security spies are exempt from this.

Tim Dawson, freelance organizer at the National Union of Journalists – who also convenes the International Federation of Journalists’ working group on surveillance – said: “UK legislation lays down clear guardrails for law enforcement agencies obtaining communications data, and includes protections specifically for journalists.”

But he continued: “The NUJ does not consider these are sufficiently robust. More disturbingly, however, it is clear that they are sometimes ignored – just look at the cases around the attempted prosecution of Barry McCaffrey and Trevor Birney.”

These two journalists were unlawfully spied on by the Met and Police Service Northern Ireland to identify the source of allegedly stolen police documents used in a documentary about paramilitary killings during the Troubles. 

The police had claimed that information revealed in the film had breached the Official Secrets Act. 

McCaffrey and Birney used judicial review [PDF] to challenge the police action and the court ruled that the searches were unlawful.

‘The digital border is expanding through policing’

In 2025, the number of requests sent by the Met to MVNO LycaMobile increased by almost 500 percent year-on-year, rising from 15,702 to 93,527. This drastic spike was totally absent for other British network providers such as Vodafone, O2, Three, and Lebara.

Considering LycaMobile’s focus on cheap overseas calling, and the likelihood of foreign nationals using its service, concerns have been raised that this data could be used for a crackdown on immigration.

Fizza Qureshi, chief executive of Migrants’ Rights Network, a charity that researches the digital hostile environment, said: “A 500 percent surge in data requests from the Metropolitan Police to a network used largely by migrants and racialized people makes clear that the digital border is expanding through policing.”

This checks out, considering the Home Office recently said immigration enforcement officers can now, under the Border Security, Asylum, and Immigration Act 2025, rifle through the mouths of undocumented migrants to search for hidden SIM-cards — as part of new powers granted to seize phones and gather digital intelligence.

The new powers came into force last year in December, despite legal reviews finding procedural unfairness of such searches. In 2022, a High Court ruling found the Home Office’s controversial seizure and retention of over 2,000 migrants’ mobile phones was unlawful.

“Migrants and racialized people are singled out for surveillance that would never be tolerated elsewhere,” according to Qureshi. “They are treated as acceptable subjects for intrusive monitoring, from phone records to delivery routes. This marks part of a wider trend of pre-emptive criminalization of migrants and racialized people and is an enormous infringement of our right to privacy.”

While a Met spokesperson denied any indication that the increase was specifically related to immigration crime, they offered a pretty milquetoast example that an increase in requests to a specific mobile operator could have been due to its increased popularity. 

If this were the case, Lycamobile would have needed to have grown its users from an estimated 2 million to 10 million for the surge to be consistent.

LycaMobile did not respond to The Register’s queries.

Additionally, Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP) – a part of the Met – started a procurement process for software for a Communication Exploitation Data Tool last year. Some of the requirements listed on the procurement notice were to process data from Uber rides and deliveries to be used for “intelligence analysis.”

At the time of publication, it read:

It’s understood the requirements for the project have now changed. When asked for further details, including if a supplier has been found, a CTP spokesperson told The Register: “We previously confirmed a routine tender process to procure software, however further details on systems and their use will not be made publicly available.”

This is not surprising given the operational secrecy around national security tech; or, in this case, takeaway delivery surveillance.

Dr Keenan explained: “It’s what the government wants the police to be doing: bringing in these capacities to synthesize multiple different data points to use them effectively and to have these powerful surveillance technologies.”

The Met Police requested data from ride and food delivery services Uber, Bolt, JustEat, Deliveroo, and Dominos Pizza a sum total of 768 times in 2025.

Hundreds of delivery drivers were arrested last year in a spate of immigration enforcement operations, not long after gig economy firms pledged to use facial recognition checks and fraud detection tech to clamp down on illegal working.

In response to all of the findings and questions posed by El Reg, a Met spokesperson said: “Every year the Met makes thousands of requests for communications data from a wide range of companies and telephone providers. The information provided helps our officers gather intelligence, solve crimes and find missing people.” ®

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