{"id":60255,"date":"2026-03-03T21:11:03","date_gmt":"2026-03-03T21:11:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/?p=145483"},"modified":"2026-03-03T21:11:03","modified_gmt":"2026-03-03T21:11:03","slug":"signed-malware-impersonating-workplace-apps-deploys-rmm-backdoors","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.threatshub.org\/blog\/signed-malware-impersonating-workplace-apps-deploys-rmm-backdoors\/","title":{"rendered":"Signed malware impersonating workplace apps deploys RMM backdoors"},"content":{"rendered":"<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In February 2026, Microsoft Defender Experts identified multiple phishing campaigns attributed to an unknown threat actor. The campaigns used workplace meeting lures, PDF attachments, and abuse of legitimate binaries to deliver signed malware.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Phishing emails directed users to download malicious executables masquerading as legitimate software. The files were digitally signed using an Extended Validation (EV) certificate issued to TrustConnect Software PTY LTD. Once executed, the applications installed remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools that enabled the attacker to establish persistent access on compromised systems.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These campaigns demonstrate how familiar branding and trusted digital signatures can be abused to bypass user suspicion and gain an initial foothold in enterprise environments.<\/p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"attack-chain-overview\">Attack chain overview<\/h2>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-7.webp\" alt class=\"wp-image-145484 webp-format\" srcset data-orig-src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-7.webp\"><\/figure>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Based on Defender telemetry, Microsoft Defender Experts conducted forensic analysis that identified a campaign centered on deceptive phishing emails delivering counterfeit PDF attachments or links impersonating meeting invitations, financial documents, invoices, and organizational notifications.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The lures directed users to download malicious executables masquerading as legitimate software, including <code>msteams.exe<\/code>, <code>trustconnectagent.exe<\/code>, <code>adobereader.exe<\/code>, <code>zoomworkspace.clientsetup.exe<\/code>, and <code>invite.exe<\/code>. These files were digitally signed using an Extended Validation certificate issued to TrustConnect Software PTY LTD.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Once executed, the applications deployed remote monitoring and management tools such as ScreenConnect, Tactical RMM, and Mesh Agent. These tools enabled the attacker to establish persistence and move laterally within the compromised environment.<\/p>\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"campaign-delivering-pdf-attachments\"><strong>Campaign delivering PDF attachments<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In one observed campaign, victims received the following email which included a fake PDF attachment that when opened shows the user a blurred static image designed to resemble a restricted document.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-8.webp\" alt class=\"wp-image-145485 webp-format\" srcset data-orig-src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-8.webp\"><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><code>Email containing PDF attachment<\/code>.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A red button labeled \u201cOpen in Adobe\u201d encouraged the user to click to continue to access the file. However, when clicked instead of displaying the document, the button redirects users to a spoofed webpage crafted to closely mimic Adobe\u2019s official download center.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-9.webp\" alt class=\"wp-image-145486 webp-format\" srcset data-orig-src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-9.webp\"><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Content inside the counterfeit PDF attachment.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The screenshot shows that the user\u2019s Adobe Acrobat is out of date and automatically begins downloading what appears to be a legitimate update masquerading as AdobeReader but it is an RMM software package digitally signed by TrustConnect Software PTY LTD.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-10.webp\" alt class=\"wp-image-145487 webp-format\" srcset data-orig-src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-10.webp\"><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Download page masquerading Adobe Acrobat Reader.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"campaign-delivering-meeting-invitations\"><strong>Campaign delivering meeting invitations<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In another observed campaign, the threat actor was observed distributing highly convincing Teams and Zoom phishing emails that mimic legitimate meeting requests, project bids, and financial communications.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-11.webp\" alt class=\"wp-image-145488 webp-format\" srcset data-orig-src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-11.webp\"><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Phishing email tricking users to download Fake Microsoft Teams transcript.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-12.webp\" alt class=\"wp-image-145489 webp-format\" srcset data-orig-src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-12.webp\"><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Phishing email tricking users to download a package.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These messages contained embedded phishing links that led users to download software impersonating trusted applications. The fraudulent sites displayed \u201cout of date\u201d or \u201cupdate required\u201d prompts designed to induce rapid user action. The resulting downloads masqueraded as Teams, Zoom, or Google Meet installer were in fact remote monitoring and management (RMM) software once again digitally signed by TrustConnect Software PTY LTD.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-13.webp\" alt class=\"wp-image-145490 webp-format\" srcset data-orig-src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-13.webp\"><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><code>Download page masquerading Microsoft Teams software<\/code>.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-14.webp\" alt class=\"wp-image-145491 webp-format\" srcset data-orig-src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-14.webp\"><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><code>Download page masquerading Zoom<\/code>.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"screenconnect-rmm-backdoor-installation\"><strong>ScreenConnect RMM backdoor installation<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Once the masqueraded Workspace application (digitally signed by TrustConnect) was executed from the Downloads directory, it created a secondary copy of itself under<em> C:\\Program Files<\/em>. This behavior was intended to reinforce its appearance as a legitimate, system-installed application. The program then registered the copied executable as a Windows service, enabling persistent and stealthy execution during system startup.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As part of its persistence mechanism, the service also created a Run key located at: <em>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run<\/em><br \/>Value name: TrustConnectAgent<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This Run key was configured to automatically launch the disguised executable:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <em>C:\\Program Files\\Adobe Acrobat Reader\\AdobeReader.exe<\/em><\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">At this stage, the service established an outbound network connection to the attacker-controlled Command and Control (C2) domain: trustconnectsoftware[.]com<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-15.webp\" alt class=\"wp-image-145492 webp-format\" srcset data-orig-src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-15.webp\"><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Image displaying executable installed as a service.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Following the installation phase, the masqueraded workplace executables (TrustConnect RMM) initiated encoded PowerShell commands designed to download additional payloads from the attacker-controlled infrastructure. <\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These PowerShell commands retrieved the ScreenConnect client installer files (.msi) and staged them within the systems\u2019 temporary directory paths in preparation for secondary deployment. Subsequently, the Windows <em>msiexec.exe<\/em> utility was invoked to execute the staged installer files. This process results in the full installation of the ScreenConnect application and the creation of multiple registry entries to ensure ongoing persistence.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-16-1024x347.webp\" alt class=\"wp-image-145493 webp-format\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-16-1024x347.webp 1024w, https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-16-300x102.webp 300w, https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-16-768x260.webp 768w, https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-16.webp 1062w\" data-orig-src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-16-1024x347.webp\"><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Sample commands seen across multiple devices in this campaign.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In this case, the activity possibly involved the on-premises version of ScreenConnect delivered through an MSI package that was not digitally signed by ConnectWise. On-premises version of ScreenConnect MSI installers are unsigned by default. As such, encountering an unsigned installer in a malicious activity often suggests it\u2019s a potentially obtained through unauthorized means.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Review of the ScreenConnect binaries dropped during execution of ScreenConnect installer files showed that the associated executable files were signed with certificates that had already been revoked. This pattern\u2014unsigned installer followed by executables bearing invalidated signatures\u2014has been consistently observed in similar intrusions.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Analysis of the registry artifacts indicated that the installed backdoor created and maintained multiple ScreenConnect Client related registry values across several Windows registry locations, embedding itself deeply within the operating system. Persistence through Windows services was reinforced by entries placed under:<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Services\\ScreenConnect Client [16digit unique hexadecimal client identifier]<\/em><\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Within the service key, command strings instructed the client on how to reconnect to the remote operator\u2019s infrastructure. These embedded parameters included encoded identifiers, callback tokens, and connection metadata, all of which enable seamless reestablishment of remote access following system restarts or service interruptions.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Additional registry entries observed during analysis further validate this persistence strategy. The configuration strings reference the executable<em> ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe<\/em>, located in:<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>C:\\Program Files (x86)\\ScreenConnect Client [Client ID]<\/em><\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These entries contained extensive encoded payloads detailing server addresses, session identifiers, and authentication parameters. Such configuration depth ensures that the ScreenConnect backdoor maintained:<\/p>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"wp-block-list-item\">Reliable persistence<\/li>\n<li class=\"wp-block-list-item\">Operational stealth<\/li>\n<li class=\"wp-block-list-item\">Continuous C2 availability<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The combination of service-based autoruns, encoded reconnection parameters, and deep integration into critical system service keys demonstrates a deliberate design optimized for long term, covert remote access. These characteristics are consistent with a repurposed ScreenConnect backdoor, rather than a benign or legitimate Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) deployment.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-17-1024x295.webp\" alt class=\"wp-image-145494 webp-format\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-17-1024x295.webp 1024w, https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-17-300x86.webp 300w, https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-17-768x221.webp 768w, https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-17.webp 1063w\" data-orig-src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-17-1024x295.webp\"><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Registry entries observed during the installation of ScreenConnect backdoor.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"additional-rmm-installation\"><strong>Additional RMM installation<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">During analysis we identified that the threat actor did not rely solely on the malicious ScreenConnect backdoor to maintain access. In parallel, the actor deployed additional remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools to strengthen foothold redundancy and expand control across the environment. The masqueraded Workplace executables associated with the TrustConnect RMM initiated a series of encoded PowerShell commands. This technique, which was also used to deploy ScreenConnect, enabled the download and installation of Tactical RMM from the attacker-controlled infrastructure. As part of this secondary installation, the Tactical RMM deployment subsequently installed MeshAgent, providing yet another remote access channel for persistence.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The use of multiple RMM frameworks within a single intrusion demonstrates a deliberate strategy to ensure continuous access, diversify C2 capabilities, and maintain operational resilience even if one access mechanism is detected or removed.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-18-1024x256.webp\" alt class=\"wp-image-145495 webp-format\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-18-1024x256.webp 1024w, https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-18-300x75.webp 300w, https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-18-768x192.webp 768w, https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-18.webp 1078w\" data-orig-src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/image-18-1024x256.webp\"><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><code>Image displaying deployment of Tactical RMM &amp; MeshAgent backdoor<\/code>.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"mitigation-and-protection-guidance\">Mitigation and protection guidance<\/h2>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Microsoft recommends the following mitigations to reduce the impact of this threat. Check the recommendations card for the deployment status of monitored mitigations.<\/p>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"wp-block-list-item\">Follow the recommendations within the <a href=\"https:\/\/security.microsoft.com\/threatanalytics3\/44b8f927-5ab5-46bb-bb79-7ca2d4e30156\/analystreport\">Microsoft Technique Profile: Abuse of remote monitoring and management tools<\/a> to mitigate the use of unauthorized RMMs in the environment.<\/li>\n<li class=\"wp-block-list-item\">Use&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/windows\/security\/threat-protection\/windows-defender-application-control\/wdac-and-applocker-overview\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Windows Defender Application Control or AppLocker<\/a>&nbsp;to create policies to block unapproved IT management tools\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"wp-block-list-item\">Both solutions include functionality to block specific software publisher certificates: WDAC&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/windows\/security\/threat-protection\/windows-defender-application-control\/select-types-of-rules-to-create?ocid=magicti_ta_learndoc#windows-defender-application-control-file-rule-levels\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">file rule levels<\/a>&nbsp;allow administrators to specify the level at which they want to trust their applications, including listing certificates as untrusted. AppLocker\u2019s&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/windows\/security\/threat-protection\/windows-defender-application-control\/applocker\/understanding-the-publisher-rule-condition-in-applocker\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">publisher rule condition<\/a>&nbsp;is available for files that are digitally signed, which can enable organizations to block non-approved RMM instances that include publisher information.<\/li>\n<li class=\"wp-block-list-item\">Microsoft Defender for Endpoint also provides functionality to block specific signed applications using the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/techcommunity.microsoft.com\/t5\/microsoft-defender-for-endpoint\/indicators-enhancements-allow-block-by-certificates-amp-more\/ba-p\/1377586\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">block certificate action<\/a>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li class=\"wp-block-list-item\">For approved RMM systems used in your environment, enforce security settings where it is possible to implement multifactor authentication (MFA).<\/li>\n<li class=\"wp-block-list-item\">Consider searching for unapproved RMM software installations (see the Advanced hunting section). If an unapproved installation is discovered, reset passwords for accounts used to install the RMM services. If a system-level account was used to install the software, further investigation may be warranted.<\/li>\n<li class=\"wp-block-list-item\">Turn on&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/defender-endpoint\/cloud-protection-microsoft-defender-antivirus\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">cloud-delivered protection<\/a>&nbsp;in Microsoft Defender Antivirus or the equivalent for your antivirus product to cover rapidly evolving attacker tools and techniques. Cloud-based machine learning protections block a huge majority of new and unknown variants.<\/li>\n<li class=\"wp-block-list-item\">Turn on <a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/defender-office-365\/safe-links-about?ocid=magicti_ta_learndoc&amp;view=o365-worldwide\">Safe Links<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/defender-office-365\/safe-attachments-about?ocid=magicti_ta_learndoc&amp;view=o365-worldwide\">Safe Attachments<\/a> in Microsoft Defender for Office 365.<\/li>\n<li class=\"wp-block-list-item\">Enable <a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/defender-office-365\/zero-hour-auto-purge\">Zero-hour auto purge (ZAP)<\/a> in Microsoft Defender for Office 365 to quarantine sent mail in response to newly <a>acquired<\/a> threat intelligence and retroactively neutralize malicious phishing, spam, or malware messages that have already been delivered to mailboxes.<\/li>\n<li class=\"wp-block-list-item\">Encourage users to use Microsoft Edge and other web browsers that support <a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/deployedge\/microsoft-edge-security-smartscreen\">Microsoft Defender SmartScreen<\/a>, which identifies and blocks malicious websites, including phishing sites, scam sites, and sites that host malware.<\/li>\n<li class=\"wp-block-list-item\">Microsoft Defender XDR customers can turn on the following\u202fattack surface reduction <a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/microsoft-365\/security\/defender-endpoint\/attack-surface-reduction\">rules<\/a>\u202fto prevent common attack techniques used by threat actors: <\/li>\n<li class=\"wp-block-list-item\">You can assess how an attack surface reduction rule might impact your network by opening the <a href=\"https:\/\/security.microsoft.com\/security-recommendations\">security recommendation<\/a> for that rule in threat and vulnerability management. In the recommendation details pane, check the user impact to determine what percentage of your devices can accept a new policy enabling the rule in blocking mode without adverse impact to user productivity.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"microsoft-defender-xdr-detections\">Microsoft Defender XDR detections&nbsp; &nbsp;<\/h3>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Microsoft Defender XDR customers can refer to the list of applicable detections below. Microsoft Defender XDR coordinates detection, prevention, investigation, and response across endpoints, identities, email, and apps to provide integrated protection against attacks like the threat discussed in this blog.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Customers with provisioned access can also use <a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/en-us\/defender-xdr\/security-copilot-in-microsoft-365-defender\">Microsoft Security Copilot in Microsoft Defender<\/a> to investigate and respond to incidents, hunt for threats, and protect their organization with relevant threat intelligence.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\">\n<table class=\"has-fixed-layout\">\n<tbody readability=\"9.5\">\n<tr readability=\"2\">\n<td><strong>Tactic<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td><strong>Observed activity<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td><strong>Microsoft Defender coverage<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr readability=\"6\">\n<td>Initial Access<\/td>\n<td>Phishing Email detected by Microsoft Defender for Office<\/td>\n<td><strong>Microsoft Defender for Office365<\/strong> \u2013 A potentially malicious URL click was detected \u2013 A user clicked through to a potentially malicious URL \u2013 Email messages containing malicious URL removed after delivery \u2013 Email messages removed after delivery \u2013 Email reported by user as malware or phish<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr readability=\"6\">\n<td>&nbsp;Execution<\/td>\n<td>\u2013 PowerShell running encoded commands and downloading the payloads \u2013 ScreenConnect executing suspicious commands &nbsp;<\/td>\n<td><strong>Microsoft Defender for Endpoint<\/strong> \u2013 Suspicious PowerShell download or encoded command execution&nbsp; \u2013 Suspicious command execution via ScreenConnect&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr readability=\"5\">\n<td>Malware<\/td>\n<td>Malicious applications impersonating workplace applications detected<\/td>\n<td><strong>Microsoft Defender for Endpoint<\/strong> \u2013&nbsp;An active \u2018Kepavll\u2019 malware was detected \u2013 \u2018Screwon\u2019 malware was prevented &nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/figure>\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\">\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"threat-intelligence-reports\">Threat intelligence reports<\/h3>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Microsoft customers can use the following reports in Microsoft products to get the most up-to-date information about the threat actor, malicious activity, and techniques discussed in this blog. These reports provide intelligence, protection information, and recommended actions to prevent, mitigate, or respond to associated threats found in customer environments.<\/p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"hunting-queries\">Hunting queries&nbsp;<\/h2>\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"microsoft-defender-xdr\">Microsoft Defender XDR<\/h3>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Microsoft Defender XDR customers can run the following queries to find related activity in their environment:<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Use the below query to discover files digitally signed by TrustConnect Software PTY LDT<\/strong><\/p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-syntaxhighlighter-code \" readability=\"20\">\n<pre class=\"brush: plain; title: ; notranslate\" title>\nDeviceFileCertificateInfo\n| where Issuer == \"TrustConnect Software PTY LTD\" or Signer == \"TrustConnect Software PTY LTD\"\n| join kind=inner ( DeviceFileEvents | project SHA1, FileName, FolderPath, DeviceName, TimeGenerated\n) on SHA1\n| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA1, Issuer, Signer\n<\/pre>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Use the below query to identify the presence of masqueraded workplace applications<\/strong><\/p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-syntaxhighlighter-code \" readability=\"24\">\n<pre class=\"brush: plain; title: ; notranslate\" title>\nlet File_Hashes_SHA256 = dynamic([ \"ef7702ac5f574b2c046df6d5ab3e603abe57d981918cddedf4de6fe41b1d3288\", \"4c6251e1db72bdd00b64091013acb8b9cb889c768a4ca9b2ead3cc89362ac2ca\", \"86b788ce9379e02e1127779f6c4d91ee4c1755aae18575e2137fb82ce39e100f\", \"959509ef2fa29dfeeae688d05d31fff08bde42e2320971f4224537969f553070\", \"5701dabdba685b903a84de6977a9f946accc08acf2111e5d91bc189a83c3faea\", \"6641561ed47fdb2540a894eb983bcbc82d7ad8eafb4af1de24711380c9d38f8b\", \"98a4d09db3de140d251ea6afd30dcf3a08e8ae8e102fc44dd16c4356cc7ad8a6\", \"9827c2d623d2e3af840b04d5102ca5e4bd01af174131fc00731b0764878f00ca\", \"edde2673becdf84e3b1d823a985c7984fec42cb65c7666e68badce78bd0666c0\", \"c6097dfbdaf256d07ffe05b443f096c6c10d558ed36380baf6ab446e6f5e2bc3\", \"947bcb782c278da450c2e27ec29cb9119a687fd27485f2d03c3f2e133551102e\", \"36fdd4693b6df8f2de7b36dff745a3f41324a6dacb78b4159040c5d15e11acb7\", \"35f03708f590810be88dfb27c53d63cd6bb3fb93c110ca0d01bc23ecdf61f983\", \"af651ebcacd88d292eb2b6cbbe28b1e0afd1d418be862d9e34eacbd65337398c\", \"c862dbcada4472e55f8d1ffc3d5cfee65d1d5e06b59a724e4a93c7099dd37357\"]);\nDeviceFileEvents\n| where SHA256 has_any (File_Hashes_SHA256)\n<\/pre>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Use the below query to identify the malicious network connection<\/strong><\/p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-syntaxhighlighter-code \" readability=\"7\">\n<pre class=\"brush: plain; title: ; notranslate\" title>\nDeviceNetworkEvents\n| where RemoteUrl has \"trustconnectsoftware.com\"\n<\/pre>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Use the below query to identify the suspicious executions of ScreenConnect Backdoor via PowerShell<\/strong><\/p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-syntaxhighlighter-code \" readability=\"23\">\n<pre class=\"brush: plain; title: ; notranslate\" title>\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all (\"Invoke-WebRequest\",\"-OutFile\",\"Start-Process\", \"ScreenConnect\", \".msi\") or ProcessCommandLine has_all (\"Invoke-WebRequest\",\"-OutFile\",\"Start-Process\", \"ScreenConnect\", \".msi\") | project-reorder Timestamp, DeviceId,DeviceName,InitiatingProcessCommandLine,ProcessCommandLine,InitiatingProcessParentFileName\n<\/pre>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Use the below query to identify the suspicious deployment of ScreenConnect and Tactical RMM<\/strong><\/p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-syntaxhighlighter-code \" readability=\"22\">\n<pre class=\"brush: plain; title: ; notranslate\" title>\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all (\"ScreenConnect\",\"Tactical RMM\",\"access\",\"guest\") or ProcessCommandLine has_all (\"ScreenConnect\",\"Tactical RMM\",\"access\",\"guest\")\n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine !has \"screenconnect.com\" and ProcessCommandLine !has \"screenconnect.com\"\n| where InitiatingProcessParentFileName in (\"services.exe\", \"Tactical RMM.exe\")\n| project-reorder Timestamp, DeviceId,DeviceName,InitiatingProcessCommandLine,ProcessCommandLine,InitiatingProcessParentFileName\n<\/pre>\n<\/div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"indicators-of-compromise\">Indicators of compromise<\/h2>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\">\n<table class=\"has-fixed-layout\">\n<tbody readability=\"18\">\n<tr readability=\"2\">\n<td><strong>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Indicators<\/strong><\/td>\n<td><strong>Type<\/strong><\/td>\n<td><strong>Description<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr readability=\"10\">\n<td>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<\/td>\n<td>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; SHA 256<\/td>\n<td>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Weaponized executables disguised as workplace applications digitally signed by TrustConnect Software PTY LTD. &nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr readability=\"7\">\n<td>hxxps[:\/\/]store-na-phx-1[.]gofile[.]io\/download\/direct\/fc087401-6097-412d-8c7f-e471c7d83d7f\/Onchain-installer[.]exehxxps[:\/\/]waynelimck[.]com\/bid\/MsTeams[.]exehxxps[:\/\/]pub-575e7adf57f741ba8ce32bfe83a1e7f4[.]r2[.]dev\/Project%20Proposal%20-%20eDocs[.]exehxxps[:\/\/]adb-pro[.]design\/Adobe\/download[.]phphxxps[:\/\/]easyguidepdf[.]com\/A\/AdobeReader\/download[.]phphxxps[:\/\/]chata2go[.]com[.]mx\/store\/invite[.]exehxxps[:\/\/]lankystocks[.]com\/Zoom\/Windows\/download[.]phphxxps[:\/\/]sherwoods[.]ae\/dm\/Analog\/Machine\/download[.]phphxxps[:\/\/]hxxpsecured[.]im\/file\/MsTeams[.]exehxxps[:\/\/]pixeldrain[.]com\/api\/file\/CiEwUUGq?downloadhxxps[:\/\/]sunride[.]com[.]do\/clean22\/clea\/cle\/MsTeams[.]exehxxps[:\/\/]eliteautoused-cars[.]com\/bid\/MsTeams[.]exehxxps[:\/\/]sherwoods[.]ae\/wp-admin\/Apex_Injury_Attorneys\/download[.]phphxxps[:\/\/]yad[.]ma\/wp-admin\/El_Paso_Orthopaedic_Group\/download[.]phphxxps[:\/\/]pacificlimited[.]mw\/trash\/cee\/tra\/MsTeams[.]exehxxps[:\/\/]yad[.]ma\/Union\/Colony\/download[.]php hxxps[:\/\/]yad[.]ma\/Union\/Colony\/complete[.]phphxxps[:\/\/]www[.]metrosuitesbellavie[.]com\/crewe\/cjo\/yte\/MsTeams[.]exe<\/td>\n<td>URLs<\/td>\n<td>Malicious URLs delivering weaponized software disguised as workplace applications<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr readability=\"4\">\n<td>Trustconnectsoftware[.]com<\/td>\n<td>Domain<\/td>\n<td>Attacker-controlled domain that masquerades as a remote access tool<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr readability=\"7\">\n<td>turn[.]zoomworkforce[.]usrightrecoveryscreen[.]topsmallmartdirectintense[.]comr9[.]virtualonlineserver[.]orgapp[.]ovbxbzuaiopp[.]onlineserver[.]denako-cin[.]cccold-na-phx-7[.]gofile[.]ioabsolutedarkorderhqx[.]comapp[.]amazonwindowsprime[.]compub-a6b1edca753b4d618d8b2f09eaa9e2af[.]r2[.]devcold-na-phx-8[.]gofile[.]ioserver[.]yakabanskreen[.]topserver[.]nathanjhooskreen[.]topread[.]pibanerllc[.]de<\/td>\n<td>Domain<\/td>\n<td>Attacker-controlled domains delivering backdoor ScreenConnect<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr readability=\"4\">\n<td>136[.]0[.]157[.]51154[.]16[.]171[.]203173[.]195[.]100[.]7766[.]150[.]196[.]166<\/td>\n<td>IP address<\/td>\n<td>Attacker-controlled IP addresses delivering backdoor ScreenConnect<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr readability=\"2\">\n<td>Pacdashed[.]com &nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>Domain<\/td>\n<td>Attacker-controlled domain delivering backdoor Tactical RMM and MeshAgent<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/figure>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"microsoft-sentinel\">Microsoft Sentinel<\/h2>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Microsoft Sentinel customers can use the TI Mapping analytics (a series of analytics all prefixed with \u2018TI maps) to automatically match the malicious domain indicators mentioned in this blog post with data in their workspace. If the TI Map analytics are not currently deployed, customers can install the Threat Intelligence solution from the <a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/azure\/sentinel\/sentinel-solutions-deploy\">Microsoft Sentinel Content Hub<\/a> to have the analytics rule deployed in their Sentinel workspace<a>.<\/a><\/p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"references\">References<\/h2>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>This research is provided by Microsoft Defender Security Research with contributions from\u202fSai Chakri Kandalai<\/em>.<\/p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"learn-more\"><strong>Learn more<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/h2>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Review\u202four\u202fdocumentation\u202fto learn\u202fmore about our real-time protection capabilities and see how\u202fto\u202fenable them within your\u202forganization.\u202f\u202f&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p> READ MORE <a href=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/2026\/03\/03\/signed-malware-impersonating-workplace-apps-deploys-rmm-backdoors\/\">HERE<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Signed malware backed by a stolen EV certificate deployed legitimate RMM tools to gain persistent access inside enterprise environments. Organizations must harden certificate controls and monitor RMM activity to reduce exposure.<br \/>\nThe post Signed malware impersonating workplace apps deploys RMM backdoors appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog. READ MORE HERE&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"colormag_page_layout":"default_layout","footnotes":""},"categories":[276],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-60255","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-microsoft-secure"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v28.1 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Signed malware impersonating workplace apps deploys RMM backdoors 2026 | ThreatsHub Cybersecurity News<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"ThreatsHub Cybersecurity News | ThreatsHub.org | Cloud Security &amp; Cyber Threats Analysis Hub. 100% Free OSINT Threat Intelligent and Cybersecurity News.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" 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