{"id":60221,"date":"2026-02-24T17:28:24","date_gmt":"2026-02-24T17:28:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/?p=145338"},"modified":"2026-02-24T17:28:24","modified_gmt":"2026-02-24T17:28:24","slug":"developer-targeting-campaign-using-malicious-next-js-repositories","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.threatshub.org\/blog\/developer-targeting-campaign-using-malicious-next-js-repositories\/","title":{"rendered":"Developer-targeting campaign using malicious Next.js repositories"},"content":{"rendered":"<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Microsoft Defender Experts identified a coordinated developer-targeting campaign delivered through malicious repositories disguised as legitimate Next.js projects and technical assessment materials. Telemetry collected during this investigation indicates the activity aligns with a broader cluster of threats that use job-themed lures to blend into routine developer workflows and increase the likelihood of code execution.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">During initial incident analysis, Defender telemetry surfaced a limited set of malicious repositories directly involved in observed compromises. Further investigation expanded the scope by reviewing repository contents, naming conventions, and shared coding patterns. These artifacts were cross-referenced against publicly available code-hosting platforms. This process uncovered additional related repositories that were not directly referenced in observed logs but exhibited the same execution mechanisms, loader logic, and staging infrastructure.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Across these repositories, the campaign uses multiple entry points that converge on the same outcome: runtime retrieval and local execution of attacker-controlled JavaScript that transitions into staged command-and-control. An initial lightweight registration stage establishes host identity and can deliver bootstrap code before pivoting to a separate controller that provides persistent tasking and in-memory execution. This design supports operator-driven discovery, follow-on payload delivery, and staged data exfiltration.<\/p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"initial-discovery-and-scope-expansion\">Initial discovery and scope expansion<\/h2>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The investigation began with analysis of suspicious outbound connections to attacker-controlled command-and-control (C2) infrastructure. Defender telemetry showed Node.js processes repeatedly communicating with related C2 IP addresses, prompting deeper review of the associated execution chains.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">By correlating network activity with process telemetry, analysts traced the Node.js execution back to malicious repositories that served as the initial delivery mechanism. This analysis identified a Bitbucket-hosted repository presented as a recruiting-themed technical assessment, along with a related repository using the Cryptan-Platform-MVP1 naming convention.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">From these findings, analysts expanded the scope by pivoting on shared code structure, loader logic, and repository naming patterns. Multiple repositories followed repeatable naming conventions and project \u201cfamily\u201d patterns, enabling targeted searches for additional related repositories that were not directly referenced in observed telemetry but exhibited the same execution and staging behavior.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\">\n<table class=\"has-fixed-layout\">\n<tbody readability=\"11\">\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Pivot signal<\/strong>&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td><strong>What we looked for<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td><strong>Why it mattered<\/strong>&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr readability=\"9\">\n<td>Repo family naming&nbsp;convention&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>Cryptan, JP-soccer,&nbsp;RoyalJapan,&nbsp;SettleMint&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>Helped&nbsp;identify&nbsp;additional&nbsp;repos&nbsp;likely created&nbsp;as part of the same seeding effort&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr readability=\"8\">\n<td>Variant naming&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>v1, master, demo, platform, server&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>Helped find near-duplicate variants that increased execution likelihood&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr readability=\"5\">\n<td>Structural reuse&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>Similar file placement and loader structure across repos&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>Confirmed newly found repos were functionally related, not just similarly named&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/figure>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Figure 1<\/em>.&nbsp;<em>Repository naming patterns and shared structure used to pivot from&nbsp;initial&nbsp;telemetry to&nbsp;additional&nbsp;related repositories<\/em>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"multiple-execution-paths-leading-to-a-shared-backdoor\"><strong>Multiple execution paths leading to a shared backdoor<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/h2>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Analysis of the identified repositories revealed three recurring execution paths designed to trigger during normal developer activity. While each path is activated by a different action, all&nbsp;ultimately converge&nbsp;on the same behavior: runtime retrieval and in\u2011memory execution of attacker\u2011controlled JavaScript.&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"path-1-visual-studio-code-workspace-execution\"><strong>Path 1: Visual Studio Code workspace execution<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Several repositories abuse Visual Studio Code workspace automation to trigger execution as soon as a developer opens (and trusts) the project. When present, .vscode\/tasks.json&nbsp;is configured with&nbsp;runOn: \u201cfolderOpen\u201d, causing a task to run&nbsp;immediately&nbsp;on folder open. In parallel, some variants include a dictionary-based fallback that&nbsp;contains&nbsp;obfuscated JavaScript processed during workspace initialization, providing redundancy if task execution is restricted. In both cases, the execution chain follows a fetch-and-execute pattern that retrieves a JavaScript loader from&nbsp;Vercel&nbsp;and executes it directly using Node.js.<\/p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-syntaxhighlighter-code \" readability=\"7\">\n<pre class=\"brush: plain; title: ; notranslate\" title>\n``` node \/Users\/XXXXXX\/.vscode\/env-setup.js \u2192 https:\/\/price-oracle-v2.vercel.app ``` <\/pre>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Figure 2.&nbsp;Telemetry showing a VS Code\u2013adjacent Node script (.vscode\/env-setup.js)&nbsp;initiating&nbsp;outbound access to a&nbsp;Vercel&nbsp;staging endpoint (price-oracle-v2.vercel[.]app).&nbsp;<\/em><\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">After execution, the script begins beaconing to attacker-controlled infrastructure.&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"path-2-build-time-execution-during-application-development\"><strong>Path 2: Build\u2011time execution during application development<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/h3>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The second execution path is triggered when the developer manually runs the application, such as with&nbsp;npm&nbsp;run&nbsp;dev or by starting the server directly. In these variants, malicious logic is embedded in application assets that appear legitimate but are&nbsp;trojanized&nbsp;to act as loaders. Common examples include modified JavaScript libraries, such as jquery.min.js, which&nbsp;contain&nbsp;obfuscated code rather than standard library functionality.&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">When the development server starts, the&nbsp;trojanized&nbsp;asset decodes a base64\u2011encoded URL and retrieves a JavaScript loader hosted on&nbsp;Vercel. The retrieved payload is then executed in memory by Node.js, resulting in the same backdoor behavior&nbsp;observed&nbsp;in other execution paths. This mechanism provides redundancy, ensuring execution even when editor\u2011based automation is not triggered.&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Telemetry shows development server execution&nbsp;immediately&nbsp;followed by outbound connections to&nbsp;Vercel&nbsp;staging infrastructure:&nbsp;<\/p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-syntaxhighlighter-code \" readability=\"7\">\n<pre class=\"brush: plain; title: ; notranslate\" title>\n``` node server\/server.js \u2192 https:\/\/price-oracle-v2.vercel.app ``` <\/pre>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Figure&nbsp;3.&nbsp;Telemetry showing node server\/server.js reaching out to a&nbsp;Vercel-hosted staging endpoint (price-oracle-v2.vercel[.]app).&nbsp;<\/em><\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The&nbsp;Vercel&nbsp;request consistently precedes persistent callbacks to attacker\u2011controlled C2 servers over HTTP on port 300.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"path-3-server-startup-execution-via-env-exfiltration-and-dynamic-rce\"><strong>Path 3: Server startup execution via env exfiltration and dynamic RCE<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/h3>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The third execution path activates when the developer starts the application backend. In these variants, malicious loader logic is embedded in backend modules or routes that execute during server initialization or module import (often at require-time). Repositories commonly include&nbsp;a .env&nbsp;value&nbsp;containing&nbsp;a base64\u2011encoded endpoint (for example, AUTH_API=&lt;base64&gt;), and a corresponding backend route file (such as server\/routes\/api\/auth.js) that implements the loader.&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On startup, the loader decodes the endpoint, transmits the process environment (process.env) to the attacker-controlled server, and then executes JavaScript returned in the response using dynamic compilation (for example, new&nbsp;Function(\u201crequire\u201d,&nbsp;response.data)(require)). This&nbsp;results in&nbsp;in\u2011memory&nbsp;remote code execution within the Node.js server process.&nbsp;<\/p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-syntaxhighlighter-code \" readability=\"8\">\n<pre class=\"brush: plain; title: ; notranslate\" title>\n``` Server start \/ module import \u2192 decode AUTH_API (base64) \u2192 POST process.env to attacker endpoint \u2192 receive JavaScript source \u2192 execute via new Function(...)(require) ``` <\/pre>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Figure&nbsp;4.&nbsp;Backend server startup path where a module import decodes a base64 endpoint, exfiltrates environment variables, and executes server\u2011supplied JavaScript via dynamic compilation.&nbsp;<\/em><\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This mechanism can expose sensitive configuration (cloud keys, database credentials, API tokens) and enables follow-on tasking even in environments where editor-based automation or dev-server asset execution is not triggered.&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"stage-1-c2-beacon-and-registration\"><strong>Stage 1 C2 beacon and registration<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/h2>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Regardless of the&nbsp;initial&nbsp;execution path, whether opening the project in Visual Studio Code, running the development server, or starting the application backend, all three mechanisms lead to the same Stage 1 payload. Stage 1 functions as a lightweight registrar and bootstrap channel. <\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">After being retrieved from staging infrastructure, the script profiles the host and repeatedly polls a registration endpoint at a fixed cadence. The server response can supply a durable identifier,&nbsp;instanceId, that is reused across&nbsp;subsequent&nbsp;polls to correlate activity. Under specific responses, the client also executes server-provided JavaScript in memory using dynamic compilation, new&nbsp;Function(), enabling on-demand bootstrap without writing&nbsp;additional&nbsp;payloads to disk.&nbsp;<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/image-33.webp\" alt class=\"wp-image-145346 webp-format\" srcset data-orig-src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/image-33.webp\"><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Figure&nbsp;5<\/em>.&nbsp;<em>Stage 1 registrar payload retrieved at runtime and executed by Node.js<\/em>.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/image-34.webp\" alt class=\"wp-image-145347 webp-format\" srcset data-orig-src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/image-34.webp\"><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Figure&nbsp;6<\/em>.&nbsp;<em>Initial Stage 1 registration with&nbsp;instanceId=0, followed by&nbsp;subsequent&nbsp;polling using a durable&nbsp;instanceId.<\/em>&nbsp;<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"stage-2-c2-controller-and-tasking-loader\"><strong>Stage 2 C2 controller and tasking loader<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/h2>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Stage 2 upgrades the&nbsp;initial&nbsp;foothold into a persistent, operator-controlled tasking client. Unlike Stage 1, Stage 2 communicates with a separate C2 IP and API set that is provided by the Stage 1 bootstrap. The payload commonly runs as an inline script executed via node -e, then&nbsp;remains&nbsp;active as a long-lived control loop.&nbsp;<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/image-35.webp\" alt class=\"wp-image-145349 webp-format\" srcset data-orig-src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/image-35.webp\"><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Figure&nbsp;7<\/em>.&nbsp;<em>Stage 2 telemetry showing command polling and operational reporting to the C2 via \/api\/handleErrors&nbsp;and \/api\/reportErrors.<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Stage 2 polls a tasking endpoint and receives a&nbsp;messages[] array of JavaScript tasks. The controller&nbsp;maintains&nbsp;session state across rounds, can rotate identifiers during tasking, and can honor a kill switch when instructed.&nbsp;<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/image-36.webp\" alt class=\"wp-image-145350 webp-format\" srcset data-orig-src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/image-36.webp\"><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Figure&nbsp;8<\/em>.&nbsp;<em>Stage 2 polling loop illustrating the&nbsp;messages[] task format, identity updates, and kill-switch handling<\/em>.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">After receiving tasks, the controller executes them in memory using a separate Node interpreter, which helps reduce&nbsp;additional&nbsp;on-disk artifacts.&nbsp;<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/image-37.webp\" alt class=\"wp-image-145351 webp-format\" srcset data-orig-src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/image-37.webp\"><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Figure&nbsp;9.&nbsp;Stage 2 executes tasks by piping server-supplied JavaScript into Node via STDIN.<\/em>&nbsp;<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The controller&nbsp;maintains&nbsp;stability and session continuity, posts error telemetry to a reporting endpoint, and includes retry logic for resilience. It also tracks spawned processes and can stop managed activity and exit cleanly when instructed.&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Beyond on-demand code execution, Stage 2 supports operator-driven discovery and exfiltration. Observed operations include directory browsing through paired enumeration endpoints:&nbsp;<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/image-38.webp\" alt class=\"wp-image-145352 webp-format\" srcset data-orig-src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/image-38.webp\"><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Figure&nbsp;10<\/em>.&nbsp;<em>Stage 2 directory browsing&nbsp;observed&nbsp;in telemetry using paired enumeration endpoints (\/api\/hsocketNext&nbsp;and \/api\/hsocketResult).<\/em>&nbsp;<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">&nbsp;Staged upload workflow (upload,&nbsp;uploadsecond,&nbsp;uploadend) used to transfer collected files:&nbsp;<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/image-39.webp\" alt class=\"wp-image-145353 webp-format\" srcset data-orig-src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/image-39.webp\"><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Figure&nbsp;11<\/em>.&nbsp;<em>Stage 2 staged upload workflow&nbsp;observed&nbsp;in telemetry using \/upload, \/uploadsecond, and \/uploadend&nbsp;to transfer collected files.<\/em>&nbsp;<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"summary\">Summary<\/h2>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This developer\u2011targeting campaign shows how a recruiting\u2011themed \u201cinterview project\u201d can quickly become a reliable path to remote code execution by blending into routine developer workflows such as opening a repository, running a development server, or starting a backend. The&nbsp;objective&nbsp;is to gain execution on developer systems that often&nbsp;contain&nbsp;high\u2011value assets such as source code, environment secrets, and access to build or cloud resources. <\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">When untrusted assessment projects are run on corporate devices, the resulting compromise can expand beyond a single endpoint. The key takeaway is that defenders should treat developer workflows as a primary attack surface and prioritize visibility into unusual Node execution, unexpected outbound connections, and follow\u2011on discovery or upload behavior originating from development machines&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"cyber-kill-chain-model\"><strong>Cyber kill chain model<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/h3>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/image-40.webp\" alt class=\"wp-image-145354 webp-format\" srcset data-orig-src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/image-40.webp\"><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\"><em>Figure&nbsp;12.&nbsp;Attack chain overview<\/em>.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"mitigation-and-protection-guidance\">Mitigation and protection guidance&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/h2>\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"what-to-do-now-if-you-re-affected\"><strong>What to do now if&nbsp;you\u2019re&nbsp;affected&nbsp;<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/h3>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"wp-block-list-item\">If a&nbsp;developer&nbsp;endpoint is suspected of running this repository chain, the immediate priority is containment and scoping. Use endpoint telemetry to&nbsp;identify&nbsp;the initiating process tree, confirm repeated short-interval polling to suspicious endpoints, and pivot across the fleet to&nbsp;locate&nbsp;similar activity using Advanced Hunting tables such as <a href=\"https:\/\/github.com\/MicrosoftDocs\/defender-docs\/blob\/public\/defender-xdr\/advanced-hunting-devicenetworkevents-table.md\">DeviceNetworkEvents<\/a> or <a href=\"https:\/\/github.com\/MicrosoftDocs\/defender-docs\/blob\/public\/defender-xdr\/advanced-hunting-deviceprocessevents-table.md\">DeviceProcessEvents<\/a>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"wp-block-list-item\">Because post-execution behavior includes credential and session theft patterns, response should include identity risk triage and session remediation in addition to endpoint containment.&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/github.com\/MicrosoftDocs\/entra-docs\/blob\/main\/docs\/id-protection\/howto-identity-protection-investigate-risk.md\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Microsoft Entra ID Protection<\/a>&nbsp;provides a structured approach to investigate risky sign-ins and risky users and to take remediation actions when compromise is suspected.&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"wp-block-list-item\">If there is concern that stolen sessions or tokens could be used to access SaaS applications, apply controls that reduce data movement while the investigation&nbsp;proceeds. Microsoft&nbsp;Defender for&nbsp;Cloud Apps&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/en-us\/entra\/identity\/conditional-access\/concept-conditional-access-session\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Conditional Access app control<\/a>&nbsp;can&nbsp;monitor&nbsp;and control browser sessions in real time, and session policies can restrict high-risk actions to reduce exfiltration opportunities during containment.&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"defending-against-the-threat-or-attack-being-discussed\"><strong>Defending against the threat or attack being discussed&nbsp;<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/h3>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"wp-block-list-item\">Harden developer workflow&nbsp;trust&nbsp;boundaries.&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/code.visualstudio.com\/docs\/editing\/workspaces\/workspace-trust\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Visual Studio Code Workspace Trust and Restricted Mode<\/a>&nbsp;are designed to prevent automatic code execution in untrusted folders by disabling or limiting tasks, debugging, workspace settings, and extensions until the workspace is explicitly trusted. Organizations should use these controls as the default posture for repositories&nbsp;acquired&nbsp;from unknown sources and&nbsp;establish&nbsp;policy to review workspace automation files before trust is granted.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"wp-block-list-item\">Reduce build time and script execution attack surface on Windows endpoints.&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/en-us\/defender-endpoint\/attack-surface-reduction\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Attack surface reduction rules<\/a>&nbsp;in Microsoft&nbsp;Defender for Endpoint can constrain risky behaviors&nbsp;frequently&nbsp;abused in this campaign class, such as running obfuscated scripts or launching suspicious scripts that download or run&nbsp;additional&nbsp;content. Microsoft provides deployment guidance and a phased approach for planning, testing in audit mode, and enforcing rules at scale.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"wp-block-list-item\">Strengthen prevention on Windows with&nbsp;cloud delivered&nbsp;protection and reputation controls.&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/en-us\/defender-endpoint\/cloud-protection-microsoft-defender-antivirus\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Microsoft Defender Antivirus<\/a>&nbsp;cloud&nbsp;protection provides rapid identification of new and emerging threats using cloud-based intelligence and is recommended to remain enabled.&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/en-us\/windows\/security\/operating-system-security\/virus-and-threat-protection\/microsoft-defender-smartscreen\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Microsoft Defender SmartScreen provides<\/a>&nbsp;reputation-based protection against malicious sites and unsafe downloads and can help reduce exposure to attacker infrastructure and socially engineered downloads.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"wp-block-list-item\">Protect identity and reduce the impact of token theft. Since developer systems often hold access to cloud resources, enforce strong authentication and conditional access,&nbsp;monitor for&nbsp;risky sign ins, and operationalize investigation playbooks when risk is detected. Microsoft Entra ID Protection provides guidance for&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/en-us\/entra\/id-protection\/howto-identity-protection-investigate-risk\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">investigating<\/a>&nbsp;risky users and sign ins and integrating results into SIEM workflows.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"wp-block-list-item\">Control SaaS access and data exfiltration paths.&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/en-us\/defender-cloud-apps\/proxy-intro-aad\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps<\/a>&nbsp;Conditional Access app control supports&nbsp;access&nbsp;and&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/en-us\/defender-cloud-apps\/session-policy-aad\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">session policies<\/a>&nbsp;that can&nbsp;monitor&nbsp;sessions and restrict risky actions in real time, which is valuable when an attacker&nbsp;attempts&nbsp;to use stolen tokens or browser sessions to access cloud apps and move data. These controls can complement endpoint controls by reducing exfiltration opportunities at the cloud application layer.&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/en-us\/defender-cloud-apps\/proxy-intro-aad\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">[learn.microsoft.com]<\/a>,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/en-us\/defender-cloud-apps\/session-policy-aad\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">[learn.microsoft.com]<\/a>&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"wp-block-list-item\">Centralize monitoring and hunting in&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/en-us\/azure\/sentinel\/sentinel-hunting-rules-creation\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Microsoft Sentinel<\/a>. For organizations using Microsoft Sentinel, hunting queries and analytics rules can be built around the observable behaviors described in this blog, including Node.js&nbsp;initiating&nbsp;repeated outbound connections, HTTP based polling to attacker endpoints, and staged upload patterns. Microsoft provides guidance for creating and publishing hunting queries in Sentinel, which can then be operationalized into detections.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"wp-block-list-item\">Operational best practices for long term resilience. Maintain strict credential hygiene by minimizing secrets stored on developer endpoints, prefer short lived tokens, and separate production credentials from development workstations. Apply least privilege to developer accounts and build identities, and segment build infrastructure where&nbsp;feasible. Combine these practices with the controls above to reduce the likelihood that a single malicious repository can become a pathway into source code, secrets, or deployment systems.&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"microsoft-defender-xdr-detections\"><strong>Microsoft Defender XDR detections&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/h3>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Microsoft Defender XDR customers can refer to the list of applicable detections below. Microsoft Defender XDR coordinates detection, prevention, investigation, and response across endpoints, identities, email, apps&nbsp;to provide integrated protection against attacks like the threat discussed in this blog.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Customers with provisioned access can also use&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/en-us\/defender-xdr\/security-copilot-in-microsoft-365-defender\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Microsoft Security Copilot in Microsoft Defender<\/a>&nbsp;to investigate and respond to incidents, hunt for threats, and protect their organization with relevant threat intelligence.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\">\n<table class=\"has-fixed-layout\">\n<tbody readability=\"24\">\n<tr readability=\"4\">\n<td><strong>Tactic<\/strong>\u202f\u202f&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td><strong>Observed activity<\/strong>\u202f\u202f&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td><strong>Microsoft Defender coverage<\/strong>\u202f\u202f&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr readability=\"6\">\n<td>Initial access&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>\u2013 Developer receives recruiting-themed \u201cassessment\u201d repo and interacts with it as a normal project&nbsp;<br \/>\u2013 Activity blends into routine developer workflows&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td><strong>Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps<\/strong>&nbsp;\u2013 anomaly detection alerts and investigation guidance for suspicious activity patterns&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr readability=\"11\">\n<td>Execution&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>\u2013 VS Code workspace automation triggers execution on folder open (for example&nbsp;.vscode\/tasks.json&nbsp;behavior).&nbsp;<br \/>\u2013&nbsp;Dev&nbsp;server run triggers a&nbsp;trojanized&nbsp;asset to retrieve a remote loader.&nbsp;<br \/>\u2013 Backend startup\/module import triggers environment access plus dynamic execution patterns.&nbsp;\u2013 Obfuscated or dynamically constructed script execution (base64 decode and runtime execution patterns)&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td><strong>Microsoft Defender for Endpoint<\/strong>&nbsp;\u2013 Behavioral blocking and containment alerts based on suspicious behaviors and process trees (designed for fileless and living-off-the-land activity)&nbsp;&nbsp;<br \/><strong>Microsoft Defender for Endpoint<\/strong>&nbsp;\u2013 Attack surface reduction rule alerts, including \u201cBlock execution of potentially obfuscated scripts\u201d&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr readability=\"8\">\n<td>Command and control (C2)&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>\u2013 Stage 1 registration beacons with host profiling and durable identifier reuse&nbsp;<br \/>\u2013 Stage 2 session-based tasking and reporting&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td><strong>Microsoft Defender for Endpoint<\/strong>&nbsp;\u2013 IP\/URL\/Domain indicators (IoCs) for detection and optional blocking of known malicious infrastructure&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr readability=\"8\">\n<td>Discovery&nbsp;&amp; Collection&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>\u2013 Operator-driven directory browsing and host profiling behaviors consistent with interactive recon&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td><strong>Microsoft Defender for Endpoint<\/strong>&nbsp;\u2013 Behavioral blocking and containment investigation\/alerting based on suspicious behaviors correlated across the device timeline&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr readability=\"6\">\n<td>Collection&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>\u2013 Targeted access to developer-relevant artifacts such as environment files and documents&nbsp;<br \/>\u2013 Follow-on&nbsp;selection&nbsp;of files for collection based on operator tasking&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td><strong>Microsoft Defender for Endpoint<\/strong>&nbsp;\u2013 sensitivity labels and investigation workflows to prioritize incidents involving sensitive data on devices&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr readability=\"5\">\n<td>Exfiltration&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>\u2013 Multi-step upload workflow consistent with staged transfers and explicit file targeting&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td><strong>Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps<\/strong>&nbsp;\u2013 data protection and file policies to&nbsp;monitor&nbsp;and apply governance actions for data movement in supported cloud services&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/figure>\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"microsoft-defender-xdr-threat-analytics\"><strong>Microsoft Defender XDR threat analytics&nbsp;<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/h3>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Microsoft Security Copilot customers can also use the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/defender\/threat-intelligence\/security-copilot-and-defender-threat-intelligence?bc=%2Fsecurity-copilot%2Fbreadcrumb%2Ftoc.json&amp;toc=%2Fsecurity-copilot%2Ftoc.json#turn-on-the-security-copilot-integration-in-defender-ti\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Microsoft Security Copilot integration<\/a>&nbsp;in Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence, either in the Security Copilot standalone portal or in the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/defender\/threat-intelligence\/using-copilot-threat-intelligence-defender-xdr\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">embedded experience<\/a>&nbsp;in the Microsoft Defender portal to get more information about this threat actor.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Hunting queries&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Node.js fetching remote JavaScript from untrusted PaaS domains (C2 stage 1\/2)<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-syntaxhighlighter-code \" readability=\"16\">\n<pre class=\"brush: plain; title: ; notranslate\" title>\nDeviceNetworkEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (\"node\",\"node.exe\") | where RemoteUrl has_any (\"vercel.app\", \"api-web3-auth\", \"oracle-v1-beta\") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl <\/pre>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Detection of&nbsp;next.config.js&nbsp;dynamic loader behavior (readFile&nbsp;\u2192 eval)<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-syntaxhighlighter-code \" readability=\"16\">\n<pre class=\"brush: plain; title: ; notranslate\" title>\nDeviceProcessEvents | where FileName in~ (\"node\",\"node.exe\") | where ProcessCommandLine has_any (\"next dev\",\"next build\") | where ProcessCommandLine has_any (\"eval\", \"new Function\", \"readFile\") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine <\/pre>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Repeated&nbsp;shortinterval&nbsp;beaconing to attacker C2 (\/api\/errorMessage,&nbsp;\/api\/handleErrors)<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-syntaxhighlighter-code \" readability=\"16\">\n<pre class=\"brush: plain; title: ; notranslate\" title>\nDeviceNetworkEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (\"node\",\"node.exe\") | where RemoteUrl has_any (\"\/api\/errorMessage\", \"\/api\/handleErrors\") | summarize BeaconCount = count(), FirstSeen=min(Timestamp), LastSeen=max(Timestamp) \u202f\u202f\u202f\u202f\u202f\u202f\u202f\u202f\u202f by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl | where BeaconCount &gt; 10 <\/pre>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Detection of detached child Node interpreters (node \u2013 from parent Node)<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-syntaxhighlighter-code \" readability=\"12\">\n<pre class=\"brush: plain; title: ; notranslate\" title>\nDeviceProcessEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (\"node\",\"node.exe\") | where ProcessCommandLine endswith \"-\" | project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine <\/pre>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Directory enumeration and exfil behavior<\/strong><\/p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-syntaxhighlighter-code \" readability=\"15\">\n<pre class=\"brush: plain; title: ; notranslate\" title>\nDeviceNetworkEvents | where RemoteUrl has_any (\"\/hsocketNext\", \"\/hsocketResult\", \"\/upload\", \"\/uploadsecond\", \"\/uploadend\") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteUrl, InitiatingProcessCommandLine <\/pre>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Suspicious access to sensitive files on developer machines<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<div class=\"wp-block-syntaxhighlighter-code \" readability=\"20\">\n<pre class=\"brush: plain; title: ; notranslate\" title>\nDeviceFileEvents | where Timestamp &gt; ago(14d) | where FileName has_any (\".env\", \".env.local\", \"Cookies\", \"Login Data\", \"History\") | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (\"node\",\"node.exe\",\"Code.exe\",\"chrome.exe\") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine <\/pre>\n<\/div>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"indicators-of-compromise\"><strong>Indicators of compromise&nbsp;<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/h2>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table is-style-stripes\">\n<table class=\"has-fixed-layout\">\n<tbody readability=\"30\">\n<tr>\n<td><strong><em>Indicator<\/em><\/strong><em>&nbsp;<\/em>&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td><strong><em>Type<\/em><\/strong><em>&nbsp;<\/em>&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td><strong><em>Description<\/em><\/strong><em>&nbsp;<\/em>&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr readability=\"11\">\n<td>api-web3-auth[.]vercel[.]app&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022 oracle-v1-beta[.]vercel[.]app&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;monobyte-code[.]vercel[.]app&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;ip-checking-notification-kgm[.]vercel[.]app&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;vscodesettingtask[.]vercel[.]app&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022 price-oracle-v2[.]vercel[.]app&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022 coredeal2[.]vercel[.]app&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022 ip-check-notification-03[.]vercel[.]app&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;ip-check-wh[.]vercel[.]app&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;ip-check-notification-rkb[.]vercel[.]app&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;ip-check-notification-firebase[.]vercel[.]app&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022 ip-checking-notification-firebase111[.]vercel[.]app&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022 ip-check-notification-firebase03[.]vercel[.]app&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>Domain&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>Vercelhosted&nbsp;delivery and staging domains referenced across examined repositories for loader delivery, VS Code task staging,&nbsp;buildtime&nbsp;loaders, and backend environment exfiltration endpoints.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr readability=\"9\">\n<td>&nbsp;\u2022 87[.]236[.]177[.]9&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022 147[.]124[.]202[.]208&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022 163[.]245[.]194[.]216&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022 66[.]235[.]168[.]136&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>IP addresses&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>Commandandcontrol&nbsp;infrastructure&nbsp;observed&nbsp;across Stage 1 registration, Stage 2 tasking, discovery, and staged exfiltration activity.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr readability=\"12\">\n<td>\u2022&nbsp;hxxp[:\/\/]api-web3-auth[.]vercel[.]app\/api\/auth&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;hxxps[:\/\/]oracle-v1-beta[.]vercel[.]app\/api\/getMoralisData&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;hxxps[:\/\/]coredeal2[.]vercel[.]app\/api\/auth&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;hxxps[:\/\/]ip-check-notification-03[.]vercel[.]app\/api&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;hxxps[:\/\/]ip-check-wh[.]vercel[.]app\/api&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;hxxps[:\/\/]ip-check-notification-rkb[.]vercel[.]app\/api&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;hxxps[:\/\/]ip-check-notification-firebase[.]vercel[.]app\/api&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;hxxps[:\/\/]ip-checking-notification-firebase111[.]vercel[.]app\/api&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;hxxps[:\/\/]ip-check-notification-firebase03[.]vercel[.]app\/api&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;hxxps[:\/\/]vscodesettingtask[.]vercel[.]app\/api\/settings\/XXXXX&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;hxxps[:\/\/]price-oracle-v2[.]vercel[.]app&nbsp;<br \/>&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;hxxp[:\/\/]87[.]236[.]177[.]9:3000\/api\/errorMessage&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;hxxp[:\/\/]87[.]236[.]177[.]9:3000\/api\/handleErrors&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;hxxp[:\/\/]87[.]236[.]177[.]9:3000\/api\/reportErrors&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;hxxp[:\/\/]147[.]124[.]202[.]208:3000\/api\/reportErrors&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;hxxp[:\/\/]87[.]236[.]177[.]9:3000\/api\/hsocketNext&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;hxxp[:\/\/]87[.]236[.]177[.]9:3000\/api\/hsocketResult&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;hxxp[:\/\/]87[.]236[.]177[.]9:3000\/upload&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;hxxp[:\/\/]87[.]236[.]177[.]9:3000\/uploadsecond&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;hxxp[:\/\/]87[.]236[.]177[.]9:3000\/uploadend&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;hxxps[:\/\/]api[.]ipify[.]org\/?format=json&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>URL&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>Consolidated URLs across delivery\/staging, registration and tasking, reporting, discovery, and staged uploads. Includes the public IP lookup used during host profiling.&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr readability=\"8\">\n<td>\u2022 next[.]config[.]js&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022 tasks[.]json&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022&nbsp;jquery[.]min[.]js&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022 auth[.]js&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022 collection[.]js&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>Filename&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>Repository artifacts&nbsp;used&nbsp;as&nbsp;execution&nbsp;entry points and loader components across IDE, build-time, and backend execution paths.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr readability=\"9\">\n<td>\u2022 .vscode\/tasks[.]json&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022 scripts\/jquery[.]min[.]js&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022 public\/assets\/js\/jquery[.]min[.]js&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022 frontend\/next[.]config[.]js&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022 server\/routes\/api\/auth[.]js&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022 server\/controllers\/collection[.]js&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022 .env&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>Filepath&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>On-disk locations&nbsp;observed&nbsp;across examined repositories where malicious loaders, execution triggers, and environment exfiltration logic&nbsp;reside.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr readability=\"7\">\n<td>\u2022 ddd43e493cb333c1cc5d7cd50a6a5a61ecd89cfa5f4076f62c2adf96748b87f8&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022 449e2bf57ab4790427a3a7de3d98b6c540e76190a3d844de2f0e7b66be842b19&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022 07ad8525844ce61471e08e8c515b76bf063bac482394152bad814026cd577f69&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022 e4d71aa95be0725c351e9d1d273d35ccdb0a8bdb31a57927c8738431b89788f5&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022 13152dcb3be425e1ce0f085cd733121a4665cf9935cf8867738e3d510a80308a&nbsp;<br \/>\u2022 6d59740d0710da370d5c38ddf88d6912487a1799e4ad09b72d764a3d27ed16b3&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>Hash (SHA-256)&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>File hashes&nbsp;observed&nbsp;within the analyzed repository set and related activity.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr readability=\"4\">\n<td>\u2022 9ab4045654a6d97762f9ae8bb97d4ecf67fa53ab&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>Hash (SHA-1)&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/td>\n<td>File hash&nbsp;observed&nbsp;within the analyzed activity set.&nbsp;<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/figure>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"references\">References&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/h2>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>This research is provided by Microsoft Defender Security Research with contributions from\u202fColin Milligan.<\/em><\/p>\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"learn-more\">Learn more&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/h2>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Review\u202four\u202fdocumentation\u202fto learn\u202fmore about our real-time protection capabilities and see how\u202fto\u202fenable them within your\u202forganization.\u202f\u202f&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Explore\u202f<a href=\"https:\/\/eurppc-word-edit.officeapps.live.com\/we\/%E2%80%A2%09https:\/learn.microsoft.com\/en-us\/microsoft-365-copilot\/extensibility\/copilot-studio-agent-builder\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">how to build and customize agents with Copilot Studio Agent Builder<\/a>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/en-us\/copilot\/microsoft-365\/microsoft-365-copilot-ai-security\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Microsoft 365 Copilot AI security documentation<\/a>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/2024\/04\/11\/how-microsoft-discovers-and-mitigates-evolving-attacks-against-ai-guardrails\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">How Microsoft discovers and mitigates evolving attacks against AI guardrails<\/a>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Learn more about\u202f<a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/en-us\/defender-cloud-apps\/ai-agent-protection\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">securing Copilot Studio agents with Microsoft Defender<\/a>\u202f&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Learn more about\u202f<a href=\"https:\/\/learn.microsoft.com\/en-us\/defender-cloud-apps\/real-time-agent-protection-during-runtime\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Protect your agents in real-time during runtime (Preview) \u2013 Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps | Microsoft Learn<\/a>\u202f\u202f&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>READ MORE <a href=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/2026\/02\/24\/c2-developer-targeting-campaign\/\">HERE<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>A developer-targeting campaign leveraged malicious Next.js repositories to trigger a covert RCE-to-C2 chain through standard build workflows. The activity demonstrates how staged command-and-control can hide inside routine development tasks.<br \/>\nThe post Developer-targeting campaign using malicious Next.js repositories appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog. 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