{"id":45014,"date":"2022-01-27T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2022-01-27T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"urn:uuid:29dbd9d2-5950-5b37-4fad-769932ee2f16"},"modified":"2022-01-27T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2022-01-27T00:00:00","slug":"defending-the-supply-chain-why-the-dds-protocol-is-critical-in-industrial-and-software-systems","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.threatshub.org\/blog\/defending-the-supply-chain-why-the-dds-protocol-is-critical-in-industrial-and-software-systems\/","title":{"rendered":"Defending the Supply Chain: Why the DDS Protocol is Critical in Industrial and Software Systems"},"content":{"rendered":"

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By measuring the exposure of DDS services, in one month we found 643 distinct public-facing DDS services in 34 countries affecting 100 organizations via 89 internet service providers (ISPs). Of the DDS implementations by seven distinct vendors (one of which we were initially unaware of), 202 leaked private IP addresses (referring to internal network architecture details), and seven supposedly secret URLs. Some of these IP addresses expose unpatched or outdated DDS implementations, which are affected by some of the vulnerabilities that we\u2019ve discovered and disclosed in November.<\/p>\n

This research is from the collaboration of Trend Micro Research<\/a> and TXOne Networks<\/a> (Federico Maggi, Mars Cheng, Patrick Kuo, Chizuru Toyama, Rainer Vosseler, and Ta-Lun Yen), ADLINK Labs<\/a> (with Erik Boasson, one of the inventors and core developers of DDS), Alias Robotics (with V\u00edctor Mayoral Vilches, Robotics Architect), and Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative (ZDI<\/a>). We analyzed the specifications of DDS and the six implementations maintained by certified vendors with millions of deployments globally. During our research, we interviewed key DDS users and system integrators to collect their feedback on our findings and the importance of DDS for innovation in their respective sectors.<\/p>\n

As a critical piece of technology that receives little attention and considering our findings, we encourage other researchers, DDS users, and implementors to promote security awareness about DDS and its ecosystem. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities in any of the critical sectors where DDS is used can have consequences, such as (including nomenclature referring to the ATT&CK ICS framework):<\/p>\n